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IN LEGITIMATE STIRPS: THE CONCEPT OF
"ARBITRARY," THE SUPREMACY OF
PARLIAMENT, AND THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
John Phillip Reid*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Words play a role in the ebb and flow of constitutional tides.
Over the centuries usage and definitions may remain more constant than has been thought. A case in point is the word "arbitrary." After news was received that the Stamp Act' had been
passed by Parliament, Virginia's Richard Henry Lee warned that
"the mother country" might soon be "converted into an arbitrary,
cruel, and oppressive stepdame. ' '2 The colonies, he argued, were

on notice to devise measures preventing "the future extention of
arbitrary unconstitutional power."'3 Up in New England the voters of Boston were saying much the same. America's complaint,
they resolved, was against "arbitrary and unconstitutional Innovations." 4 Submission to the Stamp Act, the lower house of the
Massachusetts general court agreed, "supposes such a wanton
exercise of mere arbitrary power, as ought never to be surmised
of the patrons of liberty and justice." 5
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. B.SS., 1952, Georgetown
University; LL.B., 1955, Harvard University; M.A., 1957, University of New Hampshire;
LL.M., 1960, J.S.D., 1962, New York University.
1. 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765).
2. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Arthur Lee (July 4, 1765), reprinted in 1 THE
L=rrs OF RicHAw HENRY LEE 1762-1778, at 10 (J. Ballagh ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited
as LEE LhrrERS].
3. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Landon Carter (June 22, 1765), reprintedin LEE
LErrERs, supra note 2, at 7, 9.
4. Instructions of the Town of Boston, Sept. 18, 1765, The Mass. Gazette and Boston
News-Letter, Sept. 19, 1765, at 2, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as News-Letter].
5. Answer of the House of Representatives to Gov. Francis Bernard, Oct. 23, 1765, in
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When members of the Massachusetts house resolved that
actions of their governor tended "to overthrow the constitution of
this government, and to introduce arbitrary power into the province,"'6 they were thinking of more than personal or political corruption. 7 The danger, they knew, lay in institutions as much as
with officials: the courts of law, for example.8 Virginia's House of
Burgesses asserted in 1770 that by setting trials at civil rather
than common law, recently-enacted imperial revenue statutes
"expose the persons and estates of your Majesty's affectionate
subjects to the arbitrary decisions of distant Courts of Admiralty
.

. "q Being deprived of trial by jury, New York's general as.

sembly explained, meant that "Individuals are at the arbitrary
Disposition of the executive Powers." The same was true for
judicial tenure and compensation. Any Justice of the Superior
Court, the Massachusetts house resolved, who accepted his salary
from the crown and not the general court, "is an enemy of the
constitution, and has it in his heart to promote the establishment
of an arbitrary government in the province."" For judges to be
independent of the colony for their support threatened "an arbitrary rule,"' 2 a fact especially obvious when one considered America's "great distance from the throne."
SPEECHES OF THE GOVERNORS OF MASSACHUSETTS,

House OF
SPEECHES].
THE

REPRESENTATIVES, TO THE SAME

FROM 1765 To 1775; AND

THE ANSWERS OF

43, 45 (Boston 1818) [hereinafter cited as

6. Resolutions of June 2, 1773, The Boston Evening Post, June 7, 1773, at 3, col. 1;
Letter from the House of Representatives Addressed to the Speakers of the Several Houses
of Assembly on the Continent (June 3, 1773), in SPEECHES, supra note 5, at 403.
7. Bishman, Corruptionand Power in ProvincialAmerica, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
REVOLUTIONARY MENTALITY 62, 73 (First Library of Congress Symposia on the American
Revolution 1972) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENT].
8. Of course, officials also posed a danger, especially the commissioners of the American customs who were "entrusted with Power more absolute and arbitrary than ought to
be lodged in the hands of any Man or Body of Men whatsoever." Report of the Comm. of
Boston on Rights of Colonists, Nov. 20, 1772, reprintedin J. QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASS.
BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 467 app. I (S. Quincy ed. Boston 1865).
9. Petition of House of Burgesses of Va. to the King, June 27, 1770, reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1770-1783, at 128-29 (K. Davies ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as 2 DOCUMENTS].
10. The New York Resolves, Dec. 18, 1765, reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION:
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP AC" CRIsis, 1764-1766, at 61 (E. Morgan ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as PROLOGUE].
11. Resolutions of the House of Representatives Respecting the Salaries of the Justices of the Superior Court, March 3, 1773, reprinted in SPEECHES, supra note 5, at 398.
12. Letter from Massachusetts House of Representatives to Lord Camden (Jan. 29,
1768), The Boston Post-Boy, Apr. 4, 1768, at 1, col. 2.
13. "[Ylour unhappy subjects in this province, especially at so great a distance from
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Arguments that the colonies were not harassed by Great Britain are irrelevant. Historians have not appreciated that under an
unwritten constitution the threat of arbitrary rule can be as important as the reality. It is not material, for example, that the
British government never removed stubborn colonial judges. In
fact, there had never been a hint it might do so. The mere power,
unchecked and unaccountable, was enough to create a situation
that lawyers called "arbitrary." The possibility was as dangerous
as the actuality. The painful truth, as William Hicks pointed out,
was "that liberty is only to be supported by a steady opposition
to the first advances of arbitrary power."" The adjective "arbitrary," not the noun "power," was the operative consideration.
Power per se could be dangerous, not because of its nature but
because it might become arbitrary. Fail to resist, and all could
be lost.'II.

THE MEANING OF "ARBITRARY"

Throughout American colonial and English history, the word
"arbitrary" was loosely used, sometimes as an adjective implying
bad public policy,16 sometimes as the equivalent of "unlawful,"
of "unjust," or of "slavery,

17

and sometimes in a way that today

the throne, are exposed to an arbitrary rule and the preversion of law and justice by judges
absolutely dependent for their commissions and Support." Petition of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives to the King, March 6, 1773, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUrION 1770-1783: TRANSCRIPTS 1773, at 100, 102 (K. Davies ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as 6 DOCUMENTS].
14. William Hicks, as quoted in S.C. Gazette, Apr. 4, 1768, at 1, col. 4.
15. Bailyn, GeneralIntroduction,in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 17501776, at 338-39, 663-64 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1 PAMPHLETS].
16. E.g., the statement that quartering troops in private houses would be opposed "as
Arbitrary and Contrary to the natural Liberty of the Subject." Letter from Agent Joseph
Sherwood to the Governor and Company of Rhode Island, Apr. 11, 1765, reprinted in 2
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE COLONIAL GOVERNORS OF RHODE ISLAND 1723-1775, at 362 (G.
Kimball ed. 1903).
17. UNLAWFUL: E.g., the power to issue habeas corpus in cases of persons imprisoned
by legislative fiat for breach of privilege was defended as "the strongest Barrier . . .to
preserve the Liberties of the Subject, and secure the People from arbitrary Violence and
Oppression." Speech of Chief Justice Robert Wright to the South Carolina Council, Apr.
27, 1733, S.C. Gazette, May 19, 1733, at 2, col. 2. UNJUST: The words "unjust" and
"arbitrary" were often coupled as, for example, by another South Carolina judge who
described the grant by the colony's commons house of assembly of,£1,500 to the defense
fund of John Wilkes as an "arbitraryand unjust" measure. E. LEIGH, CONSmaRATIONS ON
CERTAIN POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1774), reprinted in
THE NATURE OF COLONY CONSTITUTIONS 63, 75 (J. Greene ed. 1970). A century earlier, the
title of a 1647 pamphlet coupled "arbitrary" and "unjust" by saying soldier's rights were
"[v]indicated against all arbitrary unjust Invaders of them." ENGLAND'S FREEDOME,
SOULDIER'S RIGHTS (Dec. 14, 1647), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PuITAN
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would imply "unconstitutional." Is Usually the word was employed with enough precision to satisfy a lawyer, and certainly
those using it had confidence that the reader would understand
what was meant, for "arbitrary" was seldom defined.
Perhaps the clearest definition of the word "arbitrary" was
that it meant the opposite of "liberty." In a pamphlet published
in 1649, for example, the author had common soldiers from
among Cromwell's troops protesting "that we were not a
Mercinary Army, hired to serve any Arbitrary power of a state,
but called forth and conjured by the several Declarations of
Parliamentto the defence of our own, & the peoples just Rights
& Liberties."'9 This usage of "arbitrary"-as the opposite of
"liberty"-is found in Great Britain early during the eighteenth
century as well as in the colonies during the prerevolutionary
debate." "The idea of unlimited power," an American wrote, "is

inconsistent with the genius of liberty."'" In English constitutional theory unlimited power implied tyranny, and the lesson
taught by English constitutional history was that tyranny lawfully could be resisted: 22
REVOLUTION 248 (D. Wolfe ed. 1944) [hereinafter cited
SLAVERY: "Slavery is the subjection of one man to the will

other." G.

as LEVELLER MANIFESTOES].
and arbitrary dispose of an-

BULKELEY, WILL AND DooM, OR THE MISERIES OF CONNECITCUT

BY AND

UNDER AN

(1692), reprinted in 3 COLL. CONN. HIsT. Soc'Y 79, 96 (1895). It
was also common to associate "arbitrary" with certain foreign governments, notably the
French and Turkish. Thus the same writer said: "If ever there was or can be a Turkish,
French, arbitrary and tyrannical government in Connecticut, it is so now." Id. at 192. For
further discussion of slavery, see text accompanying note 45 infra.
18. E.g., the Stamp Act was described as one of those "Arbitrary Measures as are
incompatible with [Americans'] constitutional Rights and Privileges." The Mass. Ga.
zette, June 16, 1766, at 3, col. 2. Earlier Boston voters told their representatives that
Americans were "complaining of arbitrary & unconstitutional Innovations." Instructions
of the Town of Boston to its Representatives in the General Court, Sept. 18, 1765,
reprintedin 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 7-8 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
USURPED AND ARBrrRARY

19. R. WARD, T. WATSON, S. GRAUNT, G. JELLIS & W. SAWYER, THE HUNTING OF THE
FoxEs FROM NEW-MARKET AND TRPLoE-HEATHS TO WHITEHALL (1649), reprinted in

supra note 17, at 359, 361.
20. A bill in Parliament to revoke colonial charters was described as an exercise of
"arbitrary Power." J. DUMMER, A DEFENSE OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CHARTERS 21 (1721)
[hereinafter cited as DUMMER]. Later when Massachusetts' charter was reformed by
Parliament, Bostonians were described as "victims sacrificed to the shrine of arbitrary
power." Resolves of Stonington, July 11, 1774, reprinted in R. WHEELER, HISTORY OF THE
TOWN OF STONINGTON 37 n.1 (1966).
21. From the Pa. Gazette to the Farmer, S.C. Gazette, Jan. 18, 1768, at 1, col. 4
[hereinafter cited as The Farmer].
22. Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in Law, and
the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1043, 1050-53 (1974).
LEVELLER MANwESTOES,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss3/1

4

Reid: In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of "Arbitrary," the Supremacy o

Concept of Arbitrary

463

There is an essential difference betwixt government and tyranny
at least under such a constitution as the English. The former
consists in ruling according to law and equity; the latter, in
ruling contrary to law and equity. So also, there is an essential
difference betwixt resisting a tyrant and rebellion. The former
is a just and reasonable self-defense; the latter consists in resisting a prince whose administration is just and legal, and this is
what denominates it a crime. Now it is evident that King
Charles's government was illegal and very oppressive through
the greatest part of his reign: and, therefore, to resist him was
no more rebellion than to oppose any foreign invader, or any
other domestic oppressor.?
As "arbitrary" was the opposite of "liberty," and the opposite of "liberty" was also "unlimited power" or "tyranny," it followed that another antonym of "arbitrary" was "law" or "rule of
law." Any check on unlimited power moved government away
from arbitrariness and closer to constitutional liberty, and English experience had uncovered no other check than the rule of law.
"We know that it is better to live under an hard and harsh known
written law," radicals argued during the upheavals of the 1640's
"than under the mildest arbitrarygovernment, where the Subject
is condemned at the will of their Judges." 2 Earlier the House of
23. J. MAYHEW, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING UNLIMrTED SUBMISSION AND NONRESISTANCE
To HIGHER PowERs 45 (1750) [hereinafter cited as DISCOURSE], reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS,

supra note 15, at 212, 241.
I do not deny but that the Parliament, as the stronger power, can force any laws
it shall think fit upon us; but the inquiry is not what it can do, but what
constitutional right it has to do so. And if it has not any constitutional right,

then any tax respecting our INTERNAL polity which may hereafter be imposed
on us by act of Parliament is arbitrary, as depriving us of our rights, and may
be opposed. But we have nothing of this sort to fear from those guardians of the
rights and liberties of mankind.
R. BLAND, THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED: OR THE RECTOR VINDICATED. IN A LETTER ADDRESSED
TO His REVERANCE: CONTAINING A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COLONY 22

(1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLrrs, supra note 15, at 300, 320.
24. Vox Plebis, as quoted in LEVELLE R MAN FESTOES, supra note 17, at 13.
It is the liberty of every subject to enjoy the benefit of the Law and not arbitrarily and illegally be committed to prison, nor to have his or their lives, liberties,
goods or estates diseased or taken away, but only by due process of Law, according to Magna Charta, and the Petitionof Right ....
R. OVERTrON, AN APPEALE FROM THE DEGENERATE REREsEENTATIvE BODY OF THE COMMONS
(1647), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 157, 166. Thomas Paine,

attacking Edmund Burke's definition of "The Rights of Man in Government," protested
that it meant "that government is governed by no principle whatever; that it can make
evil good, or good evil, just as it pleases. In short, that government is arbitrarypower."
T. Paine, The Rights of Man, reprinted in BURKE AND PAINE ON REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHTS
OF MAN 161, 181 (R.'Dishman ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Paine].
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Commons, protesting arbitrary proclamations promulgated by
prerogative fiat, had told James I that:
Amongst many other points of happiness and freedom, which
your majesty's subjects of this kingdom have enjoyed under your
royal progenitors. . . there is none which they have accounted
more dear and precious than this, to be guided and governed by
certain rule of law, which giveth both to the head and members
that which of right belongeth to them; and not by any uncertain
or arbitrary form of government.5
Later Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale said much the same. "Itt
is better," Hale contended, "to be Governed by certaine Laws
tho' they bring Some Inconvenience att Some time then under
Arbitrary Governm[ent] w[hi]ch may bring many Inconveniences that the other doth not."26
Because Chief Justice Hale's definition of "arbitrary" would
later be Americanized by John Adams in the constitutional
maxim of "a government of laws and not of men,"27 it is often
forgotten that it had an honourable lineage in English constitutional tradition. "In the Laws we have a native interest," Sir
Francis Bacon wrote in 1616, for "under a Law we must live, and
under a known Law, and not under an arbitrary Law is our happiness that we do live. ' 28 "As far as it may lie in you," he urged the
Duke of Buckingham, "let no arbitrary power be introduced. The
people of this kingdom love the laws thereof, and nothing will
oblige them more than an assurance of enjoying them. ' 2 The
Levellers 0 of the English Revolution were so taken by the concept
that they sought to have it promulgated as fundamental law.
25. Petition of Grievances by the Commons in 1610, reprinted in 2 State Trials 519,
524 (1816).
26. Hale, Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife JusticeHale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of
the Lawe, reprinted in W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 500, 512 (1924)
[hereinafter cited as Hale].
27. A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, art. xxx, reprintedin 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 n.1 (C. Adams ed. Boston
1851).
28. Letter from Sir Francis Bacon to the Duke of Buckingham (1616), reprintedin 2
J. SPEDDING, AN AccoUNT OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRANCiS BACON 151, 158 (1878).
29. M. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PoLurcAL THOUGHT I ENGLAND 1603-1645, at 46 (1949) [hereinafter cited as JUDSON].

30. The Levellers were the radical political party during the 1640's who opposed both
the King and Oliver Cromwell. They proposed constitutional reform that later would be

seen as presaging republicanism. S. Low & F.S. PULLING,

DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH HISTORY

705 (republished 1971).
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"Wee must therefore pray you," '3' the famous Remonstrance of
Many Thousands told the House of Commons,
to make a Law against all kinds of Arbitrary Government, as the
highest capitall offence against Common-wealth, and to reduce
all conditions of men to a certainty, that none hence-forward
may presume or plead anything in way of excuse, and that ye
will leave no favour or scruple of Tyrannicall Power over us in
any whatsoever.32
The difficulty was that the English constitutional mind had
not then and never would evolve a system under which power
could be restrained by any force other than custom. 3 3 Indeed, few
Americans, until well after the Revolution had begun, were prepared to accept the proposition that restraint could be institutionalized.3 The way out of the dilemma posed by unlimited
power for most legal theorists was to adopt the Cokean solution
and claim that something denominated as "law" was supreme."
As "law" would in time come to mean "common law," many
legalists began to think of common law procedure, with its ine31. R.

OVERTON,

A

REMONSTRANCE OF MANY THOUSANDS CITIZENS, AND OTHER FREE-

BORN PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, TO THEIR OWNE HOUSE OF COMMONS 8 (1646) [hereinafter cited
as A REMONSTRANCE]. Puritans at that time viewed the Anglican establishment in similar
terms. It was, for example, said that "in the Civil Government, eveiy man from the
greatest to the least, hath some share in the Government," while "in the Government of
the Church, all is in the hands of one man, in the several Diocesses." Hence, church
government was referred to as "a sole, absolute, and arbitrary way of proceeding" and as
"this sole and arbitrary power of Bishops." A Speech of the Honorable Nathanael Fiennes
• ..in Answere to the Third Speech of the Lord George Digsby, Feb. 9, 1640, at 17-18
(1641).
32. A REMONSTRANCE, supra note 31, at 8.

33. Itt is not possible for any humane Constitution whatsoever to be so perfect
as to answere exactly to every Circumstance 6f affaires. And therefore in the
Estimate and Measure of the goodness or Convenience of Governm[en]t we are
to weight w[hi]ch answer most Exigences of humane life, and tho' it answer
not all, yett it deserves a p'ference before any other than answers Some Occasions but not Soe many or Soe well as the former.
Hale, supra note 25, at 512.
34. Happy would it be for a people who seriously cultivate the growth of
liberty, if any refinement in political knowledge could enable them to frame
laws, so applicable and equal to every emergency, as to remove the necessity of
lodging a discretionary power in the breast of any individual: But since the
imperfection of human wisdom will not admit of such a refinement, we can only
exert our utmost endeavours, in every delegation of our natural power, to guard,
by the most prudent reservations, every such concession from those ill consequences, which may possibly follow an arbitrary exertion of this necessary, yet
dangerous authority.
The Farmer, supra note 21, at 1, col. 4.
35. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 50-51 (5th ed. 1956).
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quitable faults and antiquarian technicalities, as the reverse of
"arbitrary." "Itt is one of the thinges of greatest moment to the
profession of the Com[emlon Law,"36 Chief Justice Hale argued,
to keepe as neare as may be to the Certainty of the Law and the
Consonance of it to it Selfe, that one age and one Tribunall may
Speake the Same thinges and Carry on the Same thred of the
Law in one Uniforme Rule as neare as is possible; for otherwise
that w[hi]ch all places and ages have Contended for in Laws
namely Certainty and to avoid Arbitrariness and that Extravagance that would fall out, if the reasons of Judges and advocates
were not kept in their traces wo[u]ld in halfe an age be lost."
Hale in the seventeenth century was making a point more
telling for the eighteenth century than we, in the twentieth century, might imagine. He was exalting as a restraint upon arbitrary government one of the constitutional safeguards of which
Americans, during the prerevolutionary controversy, felt most
deprived. "There is a confusion in our laws," John Dickinson
complained," that permits "an artful judge, to act in the most
arbitrary manner, and yet cover his conduct under specious pretences."" 9 A consequence of legal "uncertainty" was to render
"PROPERTY PRECARIOUS, and GREATLY EXPOSES US
TO THE ARBITRARY DECISION OF BAD JUDGES."4'
Dickinson touched a sensitive nerve of the constitution. One
of the central tenets of British whiggism was that "[ain effective
check to arbitrary power could be maintained only if the rights
of property were scrupulously observed."4 The explanation or
constitutional theory was that Parliament, because it possessed
a constitutional monopoly on the power of taxation, protected
property from arbitrary seizure; that "parliament in its taxing
function was nothing more than an institutional crystallization of
the sanction of property." 2 Thus the safeguard lay in the institu36. Hale, supra note 26, at 506.
37. Id. Interestingly, at a later date a French lawyer, comparing common law to the
Code of Napoleon, was able to conclude that Hale's very safeguard against arbitrariness
was a law controlled through "the exercise of arbitrary power." M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN
LAWYER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 82 (1976).
38. Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies

46 (1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON:

POLITICAL WRITINGS

1764-1774,

at 364, 369 (P. Ford ed. 1895) [hereinafter cited as DICKINSON WRITINGS].
39. Id. at 370.
40. Id. at 369-70.
41. G. GUTrRIDGE, ENGLISH WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7 (1966).

42. F.

WORMUTH, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE,

1603-1649, at 14 (1939).
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tion itself and, for Americans, up to the time of the Sugar Act,4"
that safeguard had lain in the assurance that they would be taxed
only by their own assemblies. That was why the decision of the
British ministry to raise a colonial revenue by parliamentary
edict came as a double shock: by threatening property it removed
the chief barrier to arbitrary government. As militant Whig
David Ramsay explained, "the guards which the constitution had
placed round property, and the fences which the ancestors of both
countries had erected against arbitrary power, were thrown down,
so far as they concerned the Colonists."" Or, as Dickinson expressed the same thought: "If, indeed, to be subject in our Lives
and Property to the arbitrary Will of others, whom we have never
chose nor ever entrusted with such a Power, be not Slavery, I
wish, any Person would tell me what Slavery is.""
III. THE

COMPONENTS OF "ARBITRARY"

It may be thought that the danger to Americans lay in the
fact that they were not represented in Parliament. That proposition is true-property in Great Britain was safeguarded by Parliament's exclusive power to tax because the people there were represented in the guardian institution. Representation, however,
was not the operative constitutional consideration; accountability was. Representation was the mechanism that made Parliament accountable to property owners. What troubled people
about power during the eighteenth century, what made arbitrary
power less arbitrary, was accountability. Parliament was not accountable to Americans and, therefore, it was arbitrary or potentially arbitrary. In fact John Wilkes's newspaper, North Briton,
called Parliament's claim to tax the colonies an "arbitrary
Power" because it was exercised "at Discretion."46 In that context, "Discretion" meant "not accountable."
43. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1764).
44. 1 D. RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 39 (1st ed. Phila. 1789).
45. J. Dickinson, An Address Read at a Meeting of Merchants to Consider NonImportation, Apr. 25, 1768, reprinted in DICKINSON WRITINGS, supra note 38, at 411, 415.
The same complaint could be made of arbitrary monarchical government. Thus a petition
from Lincolnshire to Charles I prayed:
[Tlhat since you have disclaimed all Arbitrary Government in Your selfe, you
would not suffer it to recide in any whatsoever else, That the Monies contributed
by your People, may be to these ends onely, for which they were given by act of
Parliament. . .protesting we will not contribute to the keeping of the Seas or
Townes against You. . ..
Two PETITIONS PRESENTED TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTIE AT YORKE, THE FIRST

OF AUGUST, 1642, at 7 (1964).
46. North Briton #CXCI, reprinted in Boston Post-Boy, Apr. 21, 1766, at 2, col. 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 1

Ho/stra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

Before the prerevolutionary dispute between America and
Great Britain, the concept of governmental arbitrariness was
usually associated with monarchy. William Livingston, who used
the word "arbitrary" in conjunction with "despotic" and in opposition to "limited, 4 7 was conjuring up a danger that no longer
existed when he warned that the constitution would be robbed "of
its brightest Glory, by exalting a limited Monarch, into an arbitrary and unaccountable Pontentate": 5
When one considers the Difference between an absolute, and a
limited Monarchy, it seems unaccountable, that any Person in
his Senses, should prefer the former to the latter. For, notwithstanding the pretended Advantages under an unlimited Prince,
Despotism is a Task above the Capacity of human Nature ...
'Tis true, that a Prince, who would never abuse his uncontroulable Authority, might, in some Instances, promote the public
Welfare, beyond a Ruler whose Hands are tied by the Law: But
such a Prince is rather a Creature of the Imagination, than a real
Existence; and so unequal are the Chances against it, that it is
the Height of Phrensy, to make the Experiment."
In summary, "unlimited Power, must ever be an Object of Terror,
unless it is accompanied
with infinite Wisdom and Goodness to
50
direct its Motions."
It is somewhat odd that eighteenth-century British and
American political theorists would put monarchy in juxtaposition
with arbitrary government. Thomas Paine even defined "republic" as "the public good,"'- adding that "in this sense it is naturally opposed to the word monarchy"5 2 which "means arbitrary
power in an individual person, in the exercise of which, himself,
and not the res-publica, is the object."5 Everyone knew that
47. Independent Reflector, Dec. 21, 1752, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR
OR WEEKLY ESSAYS ON SUNDRY IMPORTANT SUBJECTS MoRE PARTICULARLY ADAPTED TO THE
PROVINCE OF NEW YORK BY WILLIAM LIVINGSTON AND OTHERs 76, 80 (M. Klein ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR].
48. Independent Reflector, Aug. 16, 1753, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR,
supra note 47, at 319.
49. Independent Reflector, Dec. 21, 1752, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR,
supra note 47, at 76.
50. Freeman, in the New York Gazette, reprinted in Boston Post-Boy and Advertiser,
Dec. 2, 1765, at 2, col. 1. Moreover, power itself was seen by John Dickinson and other
American Whigs as possessing "an encroaching nature," "what it seizes it will retain." 1
PAMPHLETS,

supra note 15, at 38-39, 663-64.

51. Paine, supra note 24, at 193.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Great Britain was not then and had never been an unlimited
monarchy. "The government of Britain," James Wilson boasted,
"was never an arbitrary government."'" The same, perhaps, could
be said about old England. Yet even Wilson, speaking of the
present, could not escape the monarchical example, for he immediately added that "our ancestors were never inconsiderate
enough to trust those rights, which God and nature had given
them, unreservedly into the hands of their princes."55
One reason theorists thought of monarchy when speaking of
arbitrary power may have been that the components of arbitrary
government most frequently emphasized were more easily associated with individuals than with institutions. Those components
were "will" and "pleasure." The subjects of George II should
rejoice, a North Carolina governor once asserted, "that they are
govern'd by Law, and not by the arbitrary Will and pleasure of
any person whatsoever." 5 6
Degrees of arbitrariness could be measured by the twin standards of "will" and "pleasure." In English constitutional
theory-at least for the disciples of Coke and the later
Whigs-"will" "came to be thought of as a power divorced from
custom and standing over against it. ' . 7 In colonial America,
where custom remained important as a source of constitutional
law despite its disappearance from British constitutionalism, "
"will" was also thought of in terms of limits restraining discretion. When the Maryland assembly failed to reform the schedule
of official fees in the colony, the governor decreed a new schedule
by executive proclamation. Legal theory then viewed fees as a
form of taxation, and Charles Carroll of Carrollton saw nothing
farfetched in comparing the governor's promulgation of the revised schedule to Charles I's proclamation of ship money. 9 Both
54. Address by James Wilson in the Convention for the Province of Pennsylvania
(1775), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 753 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as WILSON].

55.
56.
in S.C.
57.

Id. at 747, 753.
Address by Governor Gabriel Johnston to the Lower House of Assembly, reprinted
Gazette, Aug. 9, 1735, at 1, col. 2.
J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 234 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
POCOCK].

58. Reid, In Accordance with Usage: The Authority of Custom, the Stomp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1976).
59. Hampden's Case, 3 State Trials 825 (1637): An Act for the Declaring Unlawful
and Void the Late Proceedings Touching Ship-Money. 16 Charles I, c. 14 (1640).
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were executive decrees and had in common the fact that they
were contrary to custom. "[T]he assessment of ship-money was
a more open, and daring violation of the constitution, ' , Carroll
admitted, yet the Maryland proclamation granting fees without
legislative concurrence was "equally subversive in its consequence of liberty."'" To sustain the argument, Daniel Dulany
replied, Carroll "must prove it to be an arbitrary tax.""2 "What
is this power, or prerogative of settling fees by proclamation,"
Carroll asked, "but the meer exertion of arbitrary will?" 3 The
arbitrariness was not in the exercise of will alone, but in the
exercise of discretion unchecked by customary constitutionalism.
The second component was "pleasure." Considering human
weaknesses, an unrestrained will could lead nowhere but to selfgratification. "Most men," William Livingston believed, "being
naturally ambitious, and aspiring after illimitable Dominion, are
too apt to measure the Extent of justifiable Authority, by their
insatiable Appetite for an unbounded Licentiousness.""4 As previously noted, Livingston framed the danger in terms of a single
individual. The reason is probably that he was writing against the
local colonial governor and blunted direct criticism by disguising
it in terms of a general "Ruler." 6 Yet Livingston was not alone;
others did the same.66 Many Americans expressed concern about
60. D. Dulany, Antilon's Third Letter (April 8, 1773), reprintedin MARYLAND AND THE
1773: THE ANTILON-FIrST CITIZEN LErTERS 101 (P. Onuf ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as MARYLAND].
61. Id. at 101.
62. Id.
63. C. Carroll, First Citizen, reprintedin MARYLAND, supra note 60, at 144. Interestingly, John Dickinson also defined an arbitrary tax. It was a sales tax, the ultimate
payment of which was passed on to the consumer. "This mode of taxation. . . is the mode
suited to arbitrary and oppresive governments." Letter No. 7 From a Farmer in PennsylEMPIRE,

vania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies (1768), reprinted in DICKINSON WRITINGS,

supra note 38, at 349, 353.
64. Independent Reflector, Aug. 23, 1753, reprintedin THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR,
supra note 47, at 328.
65. For were the Imperfections of the Ruler considered with due Attention,
that System of Civil Rule, which is nothing more than the Will of a despotic
Tyrant, would quickly be exploded. It is unreasonable to suppose, that Government which is designed chiefly to correct the Exorbitancies of human Nature,
should entirely consist in the uncontroulable Dictates, of a Man of equal Imperfections with the Rest of the Community, who being invested with the Authority of the Whole, has an unlimited Power to commit whatever Exorbitancies
he shall think fit.
Id. at 329.
66. DISCOURSE, supra note 23, reprintedin THE AMERICAN REvOLTrION: THE ANGLOAMERICAN RELATION, 1763-1797, at 36, 43 (C. Ritcheson ed. 1969).
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individual will and pleasure long after monarchical arbitrariness
had been erased from British constitutionalism. Jonathan Mayhew, for example, wondered why "millions of people should be
subjected to the arbitrary, precarious pleasure of one single
man" 7 who could take their property, even their lives, "if he
happens to be wanton and capricious enough to demand them."'"
The explanation may be that due to English constitutional
history and English constitutional myths, people associated arbitrary "will" and "pleasure" not with government itself but with
the royal prerogative.69 There were some, however, bold enough
to say that the problem faced by the American colonies was not
individual or prerogative will. "To what purpose," Richard Henry
Lee asked of Pennsylvania, "do her merchants toil, her people
labor for wealth, if Arbitrary Will, uninfluenced by reason, and
urged by interest, shall reap the Harvest of their diligence and
industry!

' 70

John Dickinson, the man to whom Lee wrote, knew

the danger was not monarchy but Parliament, and that the "pleasure" of an unchecked institution could be as avaricious as the
"pleasure" of an unchecked individual. "If the parliament succeeds in this attempt," 7' Dickinson wrote of the Townshend
2
7

Acts,
other statutes will impose other duties. Instead of taxing ourselves, as we have been accustomed to do, from the first settlement of these provinces, all our usual taxes will be converted
into parliamentary taxes on our importations; and thus the parliament will levy upon us such sums of money as they chuse to

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. It must not be forgotten that the English never associated prerogative privilege
with unrestrained will. Among the charges deposing Richard II as king were allegations
that he had "expressly stated, with an austere and shameless face, that his laws were in
his mouth and at times in his breast, and that he alone could change and enact laws of
his kingdom." Dunham & Wood, The Right to Rule in England: Depositions and the
Kingdom's Authority, 1327-1485, 81 AM. HIST. REv. 738, 746 (1976) (quoting ROTULL
PARLIAMENTORUM (J. Strachey ed. London 1767)). Thus, it is not surprising, that when
complaining of obvious actions by the governor of South Carolina, the colony's agent,
while acknowledging "Your Majesty's royal prerogative," petitioned against "arbitrary
and unwarrantable abuse of that prerogative." Petition of Charles Garth to the King, Jan.
23, 1773, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 56-57.
70. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to John Dickinson (Nov. 26, 1768), reprinted in
LEE LETTERS, supra note 2, at 30.

71. Letter No. 10 From A Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British
Colonies (1768), reprintedin DICKINSON WRrINGs, supra note 38, at 383.
72. Particularly the Revenue Act of 1767. 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (1766).
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take, without any other LIMITATION, than their PLEA3
SURE.

IV. THE

ENGLISH REVOLUTION

An odd feature about the colonial association of arbitrary
power with individual will was that Americans revered the English revolutions of the past. Neither the Puritan Revolution
against Charles I during the 1640's nor the Glorious Revolution
of 1688 against James II had been a rebellion against the institution of monarchy. The crown survived even the execution of a
King. Although Charles was beheaded, the first English Revolution had, as Americans of the prerevolutionary era well understood," not been a revolt against the social or constitutional
order, but an armed movement to preserve the ancient customary
law of England from being obliterated by "arbitrary rule."75 A
prime consideration motivating the commons to present the Petition of Right 6 had been the Five Knights case. 77 To the extent
that it was "a protest against arbitrary government, ' 7 the petition stressed the grievance "of imprisonment by the King without
any cause being shown. 71 9 Americans later believed that the
"greatest danger from ambition is in criminal cases," 8" and it was
counted a milestone in freedom that one of the first acts of the
Long Parliament was abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, for,
as the preamble to the act asserted, "the Proceedings, Censures
and Decrees of that Court, have by Experience been found to be
73. Letter No. 10 From A Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British
Colonies (1768), reprinted in DICKINSON WRITINGS, supra note 38, at 383.

74. "For what reason, then, was the resisteence to King Charles made? The general
answer to this inquiry is that it was on account of the tyranny and oppression of his reign."
DISCOURSE, supra note 23, reprintedin 1 PAMPHLETS, supra note 15, at 212, 239.
75. Robbins, European Republicanism in the Century and a Hilf Before 1776, in
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 31, 45.
76. The Petition of Right (1628), reprinted in CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TunoRSTUART ENGLAND: A DOCUMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 1485-1714, at 200-02 (P.
Hughes & R. Fries eds. 1959) [hereinafter cited as CROWN AND PARLIAMENT].
77. 3 State Trials 51 (1815).
78. F. RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT 1 (1917) [hereinafter cited as RELF].

79. Id.
80. The greatest danger from ambition is in criminal cases. But here they
[Congress] have no option. The trial must be by jury, in the state wherein the
offence is committed; and the writ of habeas corpus will in the mean time secure

the citizen against arbitrary imprisonment, which has been the principal source
of tyranny in all ages.

Address by James Iredell before the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, reprintedin 4
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 144 (J. Elliott ed. 1881).
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an intolerable Burthen to the Subjects, and81the Means to introduce an arbitrary Power and Government.

Restrictions on the prerogative solved but part of the problem. It was soon realized that Parliament could be as arbitrary
as the crown. By the time the civil war was winding down and
Charles I was a prisoner, Levellers were complaining that committees of the commons had been arresting and imprisoning
persons for committing acts which were not made criminal by any
statute. In the "large petition," a sort of party platform or manifesto of the type the commons called "seditious" and jailed men
for reading,82 the Levellers prayed "that you will take off sentences, fines and imprisonments imposed on Commoners by any
whomsoever, without due course of Law, or Judgement of their
equalls, and

.

.

that you will enact all such arbitrary proceed-

ings, to be Capitall crimes." 83
Protests came too late. Parliament began the struggle
against Charles I by relying on the ancient constitution of England, premised on the theory that there were fundamental laws
defining English liberties-laws even the prerogative could not
ignore.84 Once finding itself at war with the King, the House of
Commons assumed a more kingly role: What had been formulated to restrain the crown was not allowed to restrain the voice
of the people. 85 "The High Court of Parliament, and the whole
Kingdome which it represents," lawyer William Prynne wrote
81. 16 Charles I, c. 10 (1640).
82. J. FRANK, THE LEVELLERS: A

HISTORY OF THE WRITINGS OF THREE SEVENTEENTH-

CENTURY SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: JOHN LILBURNE, RICHARD OVERTON, WILLIAM WALWYN

111-12

(1955).
83.

To THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND SUPREME AUTHORITY OF THIS NATION, THE COMMONS

IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED 5 (1647), reprinted in facsimile in 3 TRACTS ON LIBERTY IN THE
PURITAN REVOLUTION 1638-1647, at 403 (W. Hailer ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as 3

TRACTS]. The following year another Leveller petition prayed that "no Person be molested

or Imprisoned by the wil or arbitrary powers of any, or for such Matters as are not Crimes,
according to Law." To THE SUPREAM AUTHORITY OF ENGLAND, THE COMMONS ASSEMBLED IN
PARLIAMENT (1648), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 266.
84. Thus the speaker of the Short Parliament told Charles I:
Kings as Kings are never said to erre, onely the best may bee abused by misinformation; this the highest point of Prerogative that the King can doe no wrong;
if then by the subtilty of misinformers, by the specious false pretences of publique good. . .[the king] bee surprized and overwrought to command contrary
to law, and be executed accordingly; this commands will be void.
THE SPEECH OF SERGEANT GLANVILL IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT FOR PEACE AND

6 (1641).
85. T. PEASE,

UNITIE

THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF THE ENGLISH GREAT CIVIL WAR 7 (1916) [hereinafter cited as PEASE].
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early during the struggle, "may in divers respects be truly and
properly said, to be the Highest Soveraigne power of all others,
and above the King himselfe." 6
Prynne, who soon discovered that he was as readily subject
to arbitrary arrest under Puritans as he had been by Star Chamber, would have restrained parliamentary supremacy by keeping
the two Houses of Parliament equal. 81 Other lawyers, however,
were prepared to let the Commons rule alone, 8 and there were
even some who were willing to argue that parliamentary supremacy, or the supremacy of one house, despite being arbitrary, was
the best type of government. 9 Arbitrary power per se need not be
a constitutional evil avoided at all costs, partly, as Henry Parker
(a common law barrister and secretary to the Puritan Parliament) explained, because it could not be avoided." Besides, with
the King gone, so too was what Parker called the "danger" of
arbitrary power. "If the State intrusts this [arbitrary power] to
one man, or few, there may be danger in it; but the Parliament
is neither one nor few, it is indeed the State itself": 9
The Parliament maintains its own Councell to be of honour and
power above all other, and when it is unjustly rejected, by a
King seduced, and abused by private flatterers to the danger of
the Common-wealth, it assumes a right to judge of that danger,
and to prevent it: the King sayes, That this gives them an arbitrary unlimited power to unsettle the security of all mens es86. William Prynne, as quoted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 4.
87. C. FIRTH,THE HOUSE OF LORDS DURING THE CIVIL WAR 191-92 (1910); F. WORMUTH,
THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 88 (1949) [hereinafter cited as WoRmuTH].
88. "First, because I ever thought that the Commons made the King, and the King
made the Lords, and so the Commons were the Prime foundation." Anon., PEASE, supra
note 85, at 124 (quoting J. PRICE, THE CrrY-REMONSTRANcE REMONSTRATED).
89. [Thill
some way was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples
moliminous body, I think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world, but now
since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for Publique
Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its owne power to do itselfe right
without disturbance to it selfe, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will
oppose this Art and order.
HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND EXPRESSES

14-15 (1642), reprinted in facsimile in 2 TRACTS ON LIBERTY IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION
1638-1647, at 180-81 (W. Hailer ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as 2 TRACTs].
90. 2 TRACTS, supra note 89, at 179.
91. Id. at 200. Of course there were contemporaries who theorized from the opposite
perspective, for example, London's Lord Mayor Isaac Penington: "A Parliament may far
more easily err in government than a King or ordinary Council, for they have, or should
have their rule to act by, but a Parliament act by mere supremacy, by power paramount,
and from their determinations, there is no orderly appeal." Lord Mayor Isaac Penington,
as quoted in WORMUTH, supra note 87, at 64.
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tates, and that they are seduceable, and may abuse this power,
nay they have abused it. . . . That there is an Arbitrary power
in every State somewhere tis true, tis necessary, and no inconvenience follows upon it; every man has an absolute power over
himself; but because no man can hate himself, this power is not
dangerous, nor need to be restrayned: So every State has an
over it self, and there is no danger in it for the
Arbitrary power
92
same reason.

"To have then," Parker concluded, "an arbitrary power placed in
the Peers and Commons is naturall and expedient at all times,
but the very use of this arbitrary power, according to reason of
State, and warlick policy in times of generall dangers and distresse is absolutely necessary and inevitable."9 3
A century before the birth of Thomas Jefferson, Jeffersonian
logic, based on legislative supremacy, was propelling theorists to
Jeffersonian conclusions. Parliament was the supreme court of
England, and as "every supreme court must have the supreme
power,"94 and "supreme power . . . being in its nature so arbitrary, 9' 5 it followed that "the true meaning of the Parliament
was, that not the King, but they themselves, should have the
arbitrary government .. .. ""Theexplanation of Robert Filmer,
92. 2 TRACTS, supra note 89, at 199-200.
93. JUDSON, supra note 29, at 430 (quoting PARKER, THE CONTRA REPLICANT, His CoMPLAINT TO His MAJESTIE 30 (1647)). Charles Herle, a clergyman, agreed.
[Ilt cannot be denyed, nor avoyded that as the Government in the forme or
qualification of it was, at first an act of the will, and so Arbitrary; so it still
remaining the same it must remaine some where arbitrary still, else our forefathers should not convey that same government to us which they began, they
cannot bind us in that wherein they were themselves free: it is the priviledge of
Gods laws only to bind unalterably, now where should the Arbitrarinessof this
faculty reside for the States use, but where it was at first in the consent and
reason of the state which as (we have seen) the Law places in the Votes of
Parliament.
Charles Herle, as quoted in JUDSON, supra note 29, at 430-31.
94. R. FILMER, THE FREEHOLDER'S GRAND INQUEST TOUCHING OUR SOVEREIGN LORD THE
KING AND

His PARLIAMENT (1648), reprintedin PATRIARCHA

AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS OF

SIR ROBERT FILMER 133, 157 (P. Laslett ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as Laslett]. "It would
be further inquired how it is possible for any government at all to be in the world without
an arbitrary power; it is not power except it be arbitrary: a legislative power cannot
without being absolved for humane laws, it cannot be shown how a King can have any

power at all but an arbitrary power." R. FILMER,

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE ORIGINALL

OF GOVERNMENT: UPON MR. MILTON AGAINST SALMASIUS

(1652), reprintedin Laslett, supra

at 251, 254-55.

95. J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 112 n.2 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as GOUGH] (quoting Cromwell's son-in-law, Henry Ireton, A REPRESENTATION OF THE ARMY

96. T.

(1647)).
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a monarchist and not a parliamentarian, 9 was that "[t]he last
appeal in all government, must still be to an arbitrary power, or
else appeals will be in infinitum, never at an end. The legislative
power is an arbitrary power, for they are termini convertibiles."'
Will and pleasure, therefore, were vested in Parliament or, as
Henry Parker asserted, "all the right of King and people, depends
upon their [the two houses'] pleasure."9
The future had become visible. The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, one day to be the English and later the British
constitution, was receiving form and substance.' 0 There were, to
be sure, those who resisted, among them some who fought for
Parliament against the King.'" More interesting, many at that
time, especially among Levellers, anticipated American Whigs by
realizing that Parliament as much as the crown had to be
curbed.'2 The first of the twenty-eight fundamental articles they
drafted was a repudiation of arbitrary government,' 3 and in the
preamble of An Agreement of the Free People of England, the
Levellers agreed "to ascertain our Government, to abolish all
arbitrary Power, and to set bounds and limits both to our Supreme, and all Subordinate Authority."'0 4
The problem was how to curb the uncurbable. There were
many who, while wishing the task could be accomplished,
thought it impossible." 5 Among those unwilling to concede the
inevitable, various solutions were proposed. One was to combine
(1682), reprinted in 6 THE

ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY

161, 249

(W. Molesworth ed. 1890).
97. [If all sorts of popular government that can be invented, cannot be
one minute, without an arbitrary power freed from all humane laws: what reason
can be given why a royal government should not have the like freedom? if it be
tyranny for one man to govern arbitrarily, why should it not be far greater
tyranny for a multitude of men to govern without being accountable or bound
by laws?
Laslett, supra note 94, at 254.
98. Id. at 157.
99. 2 TRACTS, supra note 89, at 211.
100. JUDSON, supra note 29, at 431; PEASE, supra note 85, at 28-29.
101. PEASE, supra note 85, at 27.
102. Id. at 193-94.
103. GOUGH, supra note 95, at 124.
104. J. LILBURNE, W. WALWYN, T. PRINCE & R. OVERTON, AN AGREEMENT OF THE FREE
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND (1649), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 400, 402.
105. In 1643 an anonymous pamphlet argued that Parliament would be "guilty of
exercising an arbitrary power, if their proceedings be not regulated by written laws, but
by salus populi." Nonetheless, the writer rejected the possibility of parliament being
limited by written law "as both destructive and absurd." GOUGH, supra note 95, at 101.
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frequent elections with short sessions. It was even suggested that
these safeguards against arbitrary parliamentary independence
could be guaranteed by "a law paramount" that, once enacted,
would "be unalterable by Parliaments.""' Indeed, at least twice,
Parliament was urged to make arbitrary government a "capitall
offence."'' 0 It was, however, difficult, if not impossible, for a generation that believed legislative power, unchecked by royal veto
and arbitrary by its very nature, to conceive the possibility that
a mere enactment could be a restraint upon the enacting party.
Even the Levellers knew more was needed than Parliament's
word.' That may be why John Lilburne returned to the first
principle of opposition in English constitutionalism: fundamental
law."'9 And although it taxes the imagination to link Lilburne
with him, so did Charles I.
As the fortunes of war swung Parliament from fundamental
law to arbitrary power, so the same fortunes swung the King from
an emphasis on prerogative right to a reliance on the very
ground Parliament had abandoned: fundamental law. In fact,
Charles asserted that his troubles with Parliament began "because we will allow no Judge of that [the people's] Liberty but
the known Law of the Land.""' The prime example of the King
stating his case on fundamental law is the famous militia controversy of 1642, the constitutional argument that Charles claimed
106. ANON., THE CASE OF THE ARMY TRULY STATED
MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 198, 212.

(1647), reprinted in LEVELLER

107. See text accompanying notes 31 & 83 supra.
108. But if any shall enquire why we should desire to joyn in an Agreement
with the people, to declare these to be our native Rights, & not ratherpetition
to the Parliamentfor them; the reason is evident: No Act of Parliamentis or
can be unalterable, and so cannot be sufficient security to save your or us
harmlesse, from what another Parliament may determine, if it should be
corrupted.
Letter from Edmond Bear, et al. to the Free-born People of England, in AN AGREEMENT
OF THE PEOPLE (1647), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 230.
109. "The Fundamental Law of the Land," Lilbume defined as
the Perfection of Reason, consisting of Lawfull and Reasonable Customes, received and approved of by the people: and of the old Constitutions, and modem
Acts of Parliament, made by the Estates of the Kingdome. But such only as are
agreeable to the Law Eternall and Naturall, and not contrary to the word of
God: For whatsoever lawes, usages, and customes, not thus qualified; are not
the law of the land; nor are to be observed and obeyed by the people, being
contrary to their Birth-rights and Freedomes, which by the Law of God, and the
great Charter of Priviledges, they ought not to be.
LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 12 (quoting J. LILBURNE, LONDON'S LIBERTY IN
CHAINS (1646)); PEASE, supra note 85, at 138 (quoting LILBURNE, supra).

110. His

MAJESTIES DECLARATION CONCERNING LEAviEs
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precipitated the civil war." ' During 1642, freeholders in various
sections of the nation petitioned Parliament
to frame an especiall Law for the Regulating of the Militia of
this Kingdome, so that the Subject may know how at once to
obey both his Majesty and both Houses of Parliament, a Law
whereby may be left to the discretion of Governours, as little as
may be, but that the number of Armes and what measure of
punishment shall be inflicted upon the offendors, may be
expresly2 set down in the Act, and not left to any Arbitrary
power."1

When the King refused his royal assent to Parliament's militia
ordinance, the Lords and Commons claimed that necessity gave
them power to proceed alone. They could do so, the two houses
voted, "in discharge of the trust reposed in them [Parliament]
as the representative body of the Kingdome, to make an Ordinance by authority of both Houses, to set[t]le the Militia, warranted thereunto by the fundamentall Laws of the Land.""'
Charles I denied both the necessity and the power. Far from
being authorized by fundamental law, he asserted, Parliament,
by enacting the militia ordinance, violated fundamental law in a
most audacious manner:
Neither can the vote of either, or both houses, make a greater
alteration in the Laws of this Kingdom (so solemnly made by
the advice of their Predecessours, with the concurrence of Us
and Our Ancestours) either by commanding or inhibiting any
111. In his death speech as he faced the executioner, Charles asserted "that I never
did intend for to encroach upon their [Parliament's] Priviledges; they began upon me;
it is the Militia they began upon; they confest that the Militia was mine, but they thought
it fit for to have it from me." A TRUE CoPY OF THE JOURNAL OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE TRYAL OF K. CHARLES I. As IT WAS READ IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND ATTESTED
UNDER THE HAND OF PHELPS, CLERK TO THAT INFAMOUS COURT 113-14 (J. Nalson ed, 1684)
[hereinafter cited as JOURNAL OF THE HIGH COURT]. The militia ordinance is considered
the first statute enacted by an interregnum Parliament. 1 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE
INTERREGNUM 1642-1660, at 1-6 (C. Firth & R. Rait eds. 1911).
112. Prayer#11, of THE PETITION OF THE GENTRY, MINISTERS, AND COMMONALTY OF THE
COUNTY OF KENT: AGREED UPON AT THE GENERAL ASSIZES LAST HOLDEN FOR THAT COUNTY

(1642). Martial goverance was a constance grievance. Five years later it was prayed that
power given to committees or to deputy-lieutenants "may be speedily taken into consider-

ation to be recalled and made void, and that such powers of that nature as shall appear
necessary to be continued, may be put into a regulated way, and left to as little arbitrariness as the statute and necessity of things ...
may bear." The Heads of the Proposals
offered by the Army, Aug. 1, 1647, reprintedin THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE
PURITAN REVOLUTION 1628-1660, at 241 (S. Gardiner ed. 1889).

113. THE DECLARATION OF THE LORDS AND COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLES, CONCERNING HIS MAJESTIES SEVERALL MESSAGES ABOUT THE MILITIA 2 (1642).
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thing (besides the known Rule of Law) then Our single Direction
or Mandate can do.'

Parliament protested that it did not claim authority to make law
without the King's concurrence. Rather, because of the need to
put the militia under proper command, it declared
that if his Majesty should refuse to joyne with us therein, the
two Houses of Parliament being the supreame Court and highest
councell of the Kingdome, were enabled by their owne authority
to provide for the repulsing of such imminent, and evident danger, not by any new Law of their owne making as hath been
untruly suggested to his Majesty, but by the most antient Law

of this Kingdom, even that which is fundamentall and essentiall

to the constitution and subsistance of it."1

If Parliament was right, Charles replied, then fundamental law
meant no law at all for "law" would be whatever the lords and
commons declared. "Where is every mans Property, every mans
Liberty," he asked, "[i]f a major part of both Houses declare
what the Law is?" '

Parliament also had a question. "If," it

wondered, "he hath said he will make the Law the Rule of his
Power, and if the question be whether that bee Law which the
Lords and Commons have once declared to be so, who shall be
the Judge?"'' 17 Not the Parliament, Charles answered, certainly
not as long as it was unable to distinguish between its judicial and
legislative capacities:
We deny not but they may have a Power to declare in a particu-

lar doubtfull case regularly brought before them, what Law is;
but to make a generall Declaration, whereby the known Rule of

the Law may be crossed or altered, they have no Power, nor can
exercise any, without bringing the Life & Liberty of the Subject
to a lawlesse and arbitrary subjection."'
For his authority Charles I turned full circle. He praised and
quoted John Pym's speech on Stafford's impeachment, a speech
Lilburne thought an exposition of "the end and foundation of
114. His MAJESTIEs ANSWER TO A BOOK ENTITULED THE DECLARATION, OR REMONSTRANCE
OF THE LORDS AND COMMONS OF THE 19TH OF MAY, 1642, at 5 (1642) [hereinafter cited as
His MAJESTIES ANSWER].
115. THE DECLARATION OR REMONSTRANCE OF THE LORDS AND COMMONS, IN PARLIAMENT
ASSEMBLED 3 (1642) [hereinafter cited as A DECLARATION].
116. His MAJESTIES ANSWER, supra note 114, at 21.
117. A DECLARATION, supra note 115, at 13-14.
118. His MAJESTIES ANSWER, supra note 114, at 23.
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government"' and delivered by a man whom Charles was attempting to impeach for "traitorously" endeavoring "to subvert
the Fundamental Laws" and "to place . . . an arbitrary and
tyrannical power over the lives, liberties and estates of his Majesty's liege people.' ' 20 Now Charles cited Pym with approval to
argue that the Parliament of which Pym was a member had violated fundamental law when it unilaterally enacted the militia
2
ordinance. , '
The Law is that which puts a difference betwixt Good and Evil,
betwixt Just and Unjust: If you take away the Law, all things
will fall into a Confusion, every man will become a Law unto
himself, which in the depraved condition of humane nature,
must needs produce many great enormities: Lust will become a
Law, and Envie will become a Law, Covetousnesse and Ambition will become Laws, and what Dictates, what Decisions such
Laws will produce, may easily be discerned. I2
To which Charles himself added, "So said that Gentleman, and
much more very well in defence of the Law, and against Arbitrary
Power."n
The fortunes of civil war were destined to convince Charles I
that he had been wise to associate violation of fundamental law
with the threat of arbitrary government. When placed on trial for
high treason, the King was to claim that "I never took up Arms
against the People, but for the Laws.' 24 The House of Commons,
in the act of attainder indicting Charles, had also used the constitutional concept of customary or fundamental laws as the opposite of arbitrary power, charging that the King, "not content with
those many Encroachments which his Predecessors had made
upon the People in their Rights and Freedoms, hath had a wicked
119. W. SCHENK, THE CONCERN FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 31
(1948) (quoting J. LILBURNE, INNOCENCY AND TRUTH JUSTIFIED 52 (1645)).
120. C. WADE, JOHN PYM 276 (1912).
121. The Militia Ordinance, reprintedin part in CROWN AND PARLIAMENT, supra note

76, at 215-16.

122.

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE LORDS AND COMMONS TO THE KING, FOR LEAVE TO
... TOGETHER WITH HIS MAJESTIES ANSWER THEREUNTO 5 (1642) [hereinafter cited as THE HUMBLE PETITION]. Charles
also quoted different sections of the same speech by Pyr in HIS MAJESTIES ANSWER OF MAY
4, 1642, in THE DECLARATION, VOTES, AND ORDER OF ASSISTANCE OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAREMOVE THE MAGAZINE AT HULL TO THE TOWER OF LONDON

MENT, CONCERNING THE MAGAZINE AT HULL, AND SIR JOHN HOTHAM GOVERNOR THEREOF

6,

12 (1642).

123.
124.

THE HUMBLE PETITION, supra note 122, at 5.
JOURNAL OF THE HIGH COURT, supra note 111, at
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Design totally to Subvert the Ancient and Fundamental Laws
and Liberties of this Nation, and in their place to introduce an
Arbitrary and Tyrannical Government.' ' 25 Put another way (as it
was in the court's sentence condeming the King to death) Charles
had sought to introduce will and pleasure "for the Advancement
and Upholding of the Personal Interest of Will, Power and pre' 2
tended Prerogative to himself and his Family."' 1
Charles remained stubbornly consistent. He offered only one
defense, premised on the constitutional theory that once arbitrary
power was conceded, fundamental liberties were destroyed. The
Commons, the King was told, had authority to try him "according to the Debt they did owe to God, to Justice, the Kingdom,
and themselves, and according to that Fundamental Power that
rested, and Trust reposed in them by the People."'' 27 The court
that tried him, however, had been created by the Commons
alone, without concurrence of the House of Lords and approval
of the crown, an usurpation of authority Charles called arbitrary,
for it was contrary to constitutional practice, customary usage,
and fundamental law. The King stated:
For the Charge, I value it not a rush. It is the' Liberty of the
People of England that I stand for. For Me to acknowledge a
New Court that I never heard of before, I that am your King,
that should be an example to all the People of England, for to
uphold Justice, to maintain the Old Laws, indeed I know not
how to do it.'2
Sergeant John Bradshaw, lord president of the tribunal, replied
that Charles was being tried under the "law of Old" or fundamental law. 29 While insisting the Commons had constitutional
power, Bradshaw could not deny that creation of a criminal
court by one house of Parliament was unprecedented. Under the
English constitution what was unprecedented was contrary to
custom and, therefore, though constitutional, still might be what
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id. at 91. The "Charge of High Treason" read to the King at the start of the trial
alleged that Charles had been "trusted with a limited Power to govern by, and according
to the Laws of the Land, and not otherwise," had breached that trust "out of a wicked
Design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and tyrannical Power to rule according
to his Will." Id. at 29.
127. Lord President John Bradshaw, as quoted in id., at 28.
128. Id. at 57.
129. C. WEDGWOOD, THE TRIAL OF CHAMMS I, at 181 (Fontana ed. 1964). Charles was
reminded he was being tried for breach of trust. "This is not the law of yesterday, Sir
(since the time of division betwixt you and your people), but it is law of old." Id.
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English lawyers called arbitrary. ' As well as any member of the
Inns of Court, Charles I appreciated how far the issue could be
carried. He employed-and in truth he needed-no other argument to defend himself, his constitutional conduct, and (or so he
believed) the liberties of his subjects. "For," the King told the
Commons-created court, "if power (without law) may make law,
may alter the fundamental laws of the kingdom-I do not know
what subject he is in England can be assured of his life or any' 1 31
thihg he can call his own.
Charles I conceded the power, but not the legality of Parliament to place him on trial. He went to his grave insisting that
the House of Commons, by assuming constitutional supremacy,
substituted arbitrary power for lawful authority. "If," he told the
crowd gathered at his execution, "I would have given way to an
Arbitrary way, for to have all Laws changed according to the
power of the Sword, I needed not to have come here."' 32
V.

THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION

The crown's potential of rule by will and pleasure did not die
with Charles I. Checked in England, the royal prerogative was
exported to the colonies.133 In fact, even future loyalists would
recall the times of James II, together with that of Charles I, as
"the most arbitrary reigns."' 3 4 One of the articles of treason exhibited in Parliament against Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon,
accused him of introducing "an arbitrary government in his maj130. Bradshaw conceded that from Charles's perspective the king had ruled accord.
ing to law.
[Blut, Sir, the difference hath been, who shall be the expositors of this law:
Sir, whether you and your party, out of courts of justice, shall expound law, or
the courts of justice, who are the expounders: nay, the sovereign and the high
court of justice, the parliament of England, that are not only the highest expounders, but the sole makers of the law.
THE TRIALS OF CHARLES THE FIRST, AND OF SOME OF THE REGICIDES: WnTH BIOGRAPHIES OF
BRADSHAW, IRETON, HARRISON, AND OTHERS 80 (1832). Bradshaw ignored the fact that under
the traditional constitution the Commons alone was not Parliament. He did, however,
insist that there was a higher law than fundamental, customary, or constitutional law.
"Sir, as the law is your superior, so truly, Sir, there is something that is superior to the
law, and that is indeed the parent or author of the law, the people of England." Id.
131. J. MUDDIMAN, TRIAL OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST 90 (1928).

132.

JOURNAL OF THE HIGH COURT,

supra note 111, at 115-16.

133. During the crisis over seizure of Massachusetts' charter in 1683, one anonymous
writer warned that "the people in New England, being Non-Conformists, have no reason
to believe that their religion and the Court's pleasure will consist together." Arguments
Against Relinquishing the Charter,2 COLL. MASS. HIST. Soc'y 74, 75 (3d series 1825).
134. ANON. [Joseph Galloway], A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania 20 (1760),
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLTS, supra note 15, at 264. See also PETER OuvER's ORIGIN & PROu-
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esty's foreign plantations. 13 5 Even historians of our day agree
that the "chief characteristic" of the colonial policy under
Charles II and James II "was arbitrary government with little
3
respect for assemblies.' 1
Not all constitutional grievances alleging arbitrary government related to America. The Glorious Revolution drove James
I from the thrones of England and Scotland. When the Prince of
Orange and his Stuart wife were elected in James's place, Parliament hailed William as the "instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and arbitrarypower."137 These were stirring
times in London, yet what happened simultaneously in the colonies left a stronger impression on the prerevolutionary generation,
for the events of their own era-parliamentary taxation, the admiralty jurisdiction, crown salaries for the judiciary-seemed a
repetition of the arbitrary power their ancestors had fought in
1689.
Charles II had revoked several colonial charters 38 and James
II had consolidated a number of provinces into the Dominion of
New England under the governorship of Sir Edmund Andros. "It
would," Cotton Mather exclaimed, "take a long summer's day to
relate the miseries which come . . . in upon poor New England
by reason of the arbitrary government then imposed on them."'3 9
His father agreed. The colonists, Increase Mather wrote, received
no new rights as a result of the Glorious Revolution, but they did
have old ones reconfirmed-customary rights almost snatched
away by "an arbitrary government."'' 0 Andros's administration,
the New England-born, London barrister Jeremiah Dummer
maintained, had been "Arbitrary and Oppressive."''
RESS OF THE AMERIcAN REBELLION: A TORY VIEw 24 (D.Adair & J. Schutz eds. 1961).
135. Article #9, Impeachment of Clarendon,1667, in 1 THE LAW AND WORKING OF THE
CONSTITTrrION: DOCUMENTS 1660-1914, at 156 (W. Costin & J. Watson eds. 1952).
136. D. LovEjoy, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 69 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as LovEJoy].
137. 1 Will. & Mary (2d Sess.), cap. 2, § 12 (1688), 9 STATUTES AT LARGE 68.
138. Reid, In the First Line of Defense: The Colonial Charters, the Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 177, 202-04 (1976).
139. Cotton Mather, as quoted in T. WERTENBAKER, THE PURrAN OLIGARCHY: THE
FOUNDING OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 334 (1947) [hereinafter cited as WERTm AKER].
140. Increase Mather, as quoted in LovEJoY, supra note 136, at 229.
141. DUMMER, supra note 20, at 24.
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New Englanders rebelled against Governor Andros even before receiving word that James II had been overthrown. He was
made prisoner, to be transported home to England, his life spared
despite the fact that the "Arbitrary and Despotick power" he had
exercised entitled him to no mercy.' Every aspect of Andros's
administration was labelled "arbitrary.'1

3

Even the commission

the governor had received from the King was renounced as "Absolute and Arbitrary."' From the perspective of the decrees Andros
promulgated, there is little doubt that his rule was "arbitrary"
by any Whig definition, especially as he suspended some of the
most fundamental parts of the customary constitution by executive fiat. Town meetings were restricted; exorbitant fees charged;
arrests ordered on slight pretext;'45 and trials, often held beyond
the venue, resulted in "Illegal and Arbitrary Judgments":'45
Persons who did but peaceably object against the raising of
Taxes without an Assembly, have been for it fined, some twenty,
some thirty, and others fifty Pounds. Packt and pickt Juries
have been very common things among us, when, under a pretended form of Law, the trouble of some honest and worthy Men
has been aimed at: but when some of this Gang have been
brought upon the Stage, for the most detestable Enormities that
ever the Sun beheld, all Men have with Admiration seen what
methods have been taken that they might not be treated according to their Crimes.'47
A few colonists claimed Andros had not introduced arbitrary
government. Rather, they said, he replaced it. It was a minority
point of view which, as with Charles I and Parliament, turned on
how the observer evaluated the need for certainty in the constitution, defined "rule of law," and shared in the exercise of will
and pleasure. "We will not say that nothing was arbitrary or
amiss in Sir E. A[ndros]'s time," argued Connecticut clergyman
142. LovEJoY, supra note 136, at 289.
143. Id. at 288-89.
144. The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and
the Country Adjacent, Apr. 18, 1689 [hereinafter cited as The Declaration], in 1 Tni
ANDROS TRAcrs 11, 13 (1971) (reprint of 5 Prince Soc'y Pub. (1868)) [hereinafter cited as
ANDROS TRACTS].

145. WERTENBAKER, supra note 139, at 334.
146. THE REVOLUTION IN NEW ENGLAND JUSTInIM (1691) (published anonymously, but
attributed to E. Rawson and S. Sewall), reprintedin ANDROS TRA Ts, supra note 144, at
65,83.
147. ANDROS TRACTs, supra note 144, at 14-15.
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Gershom Bulkeley, "but now all is arbitrary, and we have nothing
148
but Will and Doom.
Bulkeley contended that Andros's government had not been
based on "arbitrary power."'4 In fact, Americans, or at least
those in Connecticut, "had never known the liberties of free and
natural subjects"'' ° until Andros came. "Hereby the laws and
liberties of free subjects were restored to us . . . in greater measures than ever we enjoy'd them before."' 5' The reason, as New
York lawyer John Palmer explained, was legal certainty, for that,
too, was the opposite of arbitrary:
And 'tis as plain that the King's Subjects, which for many years
had groaned under the severity of a Tyrannical and Arbitrary
Constitution, deprived of the Laws and Liberties of Englishmen, forced in their Consciences, suffered death for Religion,
and denied Appeals to the King, were eased of those intollerable
Burthens [by Andros's government], and allowed the free Exercise of their Religion, and the benefit of the Laws of England,
which were duly and truly administered unto them.' 2
Of critical importance for Palmer and Bulkeley was not popular
participation or constitutional limitations, but certainty. The
men who overthrew Andros, Bulkeley believed, "do not understand what arbitrary power is, but put darkness for light, and
miscall a legal power by the name of an arbitrary power, because
they do not love the law."'5 3 Law stood opposed to will because
law was certain. As a result of being misled by Andros's opponents, the people of Connecticut would now have to "give up
liberty, property and our very lives to the arbitrary dispose of
those who have no better either title or rule than their own will,
and are both fitted and designed to destroy the laws."'5 4
Few Americans agreed with Bulkeley. The colonial majority
thought the Glorious Revolution in England and restoration of
the charters and customary government in the colonies ended,
148. [Gershom Bulkeley], WELL AND DooM, OR THE MISERIES OF CONNECTICUT By AND
UNDER AN USURPED AND ARBITRARY (1692), reprinted in 3 COLL. CONN. HIST. Soc'y 79, 192

(1895).
149. 3 COLL. CONN. HIST. Soc'y 172 (1895).
150. Id. at 146-47.
151. Id.
152. J. PALMER, AN IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE STATE OF NEW ENGLAND (1690),
reprinted in ANDROS TRACTS, supra note 144, at 23, 42.
153. 3 COLL. CONN. HIsT. Soc'y 173 (1895).

154. Id. at 89.
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rather than perpetuated, arbitrary power.' s Surely we can ask for
no more convincing evidence of this fact than popular political
reaction during the 1760's, when the ministry in London decided
that Parliament might succeed where James and Andros had
failed. Whigs from New Hampshire to Georgia saw the connection
and knew that it had two aspects, one historical, the other legal.
The constitution Americans would fight to preserve in 1776 was
the same constitution their ancestors had struggled to restore in
1689.

VI.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

During the prerevolutionary controversy, only uneducated
Whigs could have been unaware of historical parallels. It was
natural, indeed automatic, to recall "the unlimited Prerogative,
contended for by those arbitrary & misguided Princes, Charles
the First & James the Second,"' 58 or to remind one another that
their ancestors had "fled into the wilderness to avoid the intolerable oppression and arbitrary power of the faithless Stuarts."' 17
Catholic though he may have been, Charles Carroll could boast
that "James the second, by endeavouring to introduce arbitrary
power, and to subvert the established church, justly deserved to
be deposed and banished."'58 And more on point, considering that
taxation lay at the heart of the controversy, John Hampden, who
went to prison rather than pay a forced loan and led the opposition to ship money, "has been deservedly celebrated for his spirited opposition to an arbitrary, and illegal tax."' 5
The analogy was not precisely accurate, as American Whigs
well knew. The precedents of the 1640's and of 1688-89, like
Magna Carta and its many confirmations, were viewed in Great
Britain as constitutional barriers protecting liberty "against the
arbitrary power" of a prince,' 0 not the arbitrary power of Parliament. In fact, at a time when the King had little chance to be
155. LovFjoy, supra note 136, at 288-93.
156. Billerica, Mass., Resolves, June 6, 1774, as quoted in R. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY
POLrTCS INMASSACHUSmErs: THE BOSTON COMMFIrEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE TOWNS,
1772-1774, at 202 (1970).
157. Letter of a London Merchant to a Noble Lord, Mass. Gazette, Jan. 2, 1766, at
1, col. 2.
158. Carroll, First Citizen, in MARYLAND, supra note 60, at 88. James's attempt "to
subvert the establishment of church and state, and to introduce arbitrary power, occasioned the general insurrection of the nation in vindication of his liberties," Id. at 130,
159. Id. at 149.
160. Extract of a letter from Virginia [to London], The Boston Post-Boy and Advertiser, Dec. 12, 1768, at 1, col. 3.
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arbitrary, and what power he retained was diminishing with each
reign, it was even argued that Americans, to guarantee that the
crown never again became arbitrary, should voluntarily accept
parliamentary rule. George Grenville's scheme of taxing the colonies, it was contended, would
unite every Member of these Dominions under one Authority for
the Good of the Whole, and to rescue each Individual from the
Power of any future arbitrary Prince, by collecting and assemblying them all into one Body under the happiest of all Governments, and to redeem the Property of the Subject.

.

.from any

other Controul but that of King, Lords and Commons, in one
great Parliament assembled."'
Spurious logic could not persuade Americans, certainly not
to reject centuries of English customary constitutionalism. Colonial Whigs appreciated the true thrust of the message from London: that a new arbitrary power was being flaunted as a barrier
against one that no longer existed. When Parliament adopted a
proposal granting the power to suspend the New York legislature
for refusing to obey the quartering act,'62 a South Carolinian
asked "what essential difference could be perceived by the inhabitants of New York, if they had been arbitrarily stripped of their
legislative power, by the single exertion of royal prerogative, and
not by the solemn formality of one oppressive act, subscribed by
the whole British parliament.""' 3 Returning to the royalist
perspective of Filmer and Hobbes, Americans appreciated that
Parliament was becoming an instrument of arbitrary power. Also
referring to the act permitting suspension of New York's assembly, Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the navigation acts"4
had made the colonies "a victim to arbitrary power,""' 5 claimed
that Americans were being asked to "hold their political existence
at the will of a British parliament."'' If Parliament persisted in
taxing them without their consent to obtain revenue, Thomas
161. From the London Public Advertisers, Nov. 2, 1768, as quoted in Mass. Gazette,
Feb. 13, 1769, at 1, col. 2.
162. M. KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK-A HISTORY 355-56 (1975).
163. The Farmer, supra note 21, at 1, col. 4.
164. 12 Charles Iu,
cap. 18 (1680); 14 Charles I, cap. 11 (1662); 25 Charles II, cap. 7
(1673); 7 & 8 Will. & Mary, cap. 22 (1696).
165. [T. JEFFERSON], A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774),
reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOrAS JEFFERSON 121, 124 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter
cited as JEFFERSON].
166. Id. at 126.
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Pownall, former governor of Massachusetts and a member of the
House of Commons, warned that Americans "'had reason to fear
some danger of arbitrary rule over them.' """
Although they attempted to soften the implications by using
the word "sovereignity," British lawyers did not deny that the
colonies were being told to submit to arbitrary power. "[Elvery
government can arbitrarily impose laws on all its subjects," Lord
Chancellor Northington told Chief Justice Lord Camden during
the Stamp Act Debates. 68 The fact not understood in London was
that American Whigs saw a danger to liberty where British Whigs
saw none. Colonists who might otherwise have missed the fact
that the institution protecting liberty in the home islands threatened it in the new world, had the issue spelled out in unambiguous terms by James Wilson. "Kings are not the only tyrants,"
he explained, "the conduct of the long parliament will justify me
in adding, that kings are not the severest tyrants."' 69 Alexander
Hamilton concurred:
You are mistaken, when you confine arbitrary government
to a monarchy. It is not the supreme power being placed in one,
instead of many, that discriminates an arbitrary from a free
government. When any people are ruled by laws, in framing
which, they have, no part, that are to bind them, to all intents
and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are in the strictest sense slaves, and the
government with respect to them, is despotic.'7°
The reason, while perhaps surprising, was certainly pertinent to
the prerevolutionary controversy-that there was no check on the
self-interest of legislators. 7 ' A monarch, who rules for life, might
167. T. POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES.
CONsTrrUION ARE DISCUSSED AND STATED vi (4th ed. 1768).

WHEREIN THEIR RIGHTS AND

168. GOUGH, supra note 95, at 207. In a sense, during his great debate with the two
houses of the Massachusetts general court in 1773, Governor Thomas Hutchinson said
much the same. See discussion in Bailyn, Introduction in 1 PAMPHLETS, supra note 15, at
131-32.
169. J. WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRrIsH PARLIAMENT (1774), reprintedin WILSON, supra note 54, at 721, 728.
170. A. HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED: OR A MORE IMPARTIAL AND COMPREHENSIVE
VIEW OF THE DISPuTE BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES, INTENDED AS A FURTHER
VINDICATION OF THE CONGRESS (1775) [hereinafter cited as THE FARmER REFUTED],
reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 100 (H. Syrett ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as HAMILTON].

171. James Wilson, who seems to have used the word "arbitrary" as an antonym for
"constitution," felt this was especially true once parliament could not be dissolved but
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well be more accountable as he has no personal ambitions or
economic goals.'72 Jefferson, by way of contrast, believed one to
be as bad as the other. "History," he wrote, "has informed us that
bodies of men as well as individuals are susceptible of the spirit
73
of tyranny."'
The British had an answer: No matter if Parliament's power
was arbitrary, it was not dangerous. The constitution saw to that.
The competing branches of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy were too well balanced to threaten liberty. Parliament's
composition, Henry Parker had claimed in 1642, "takes away all
jealousies, for it is so equally, and geometrically proportionable,
and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts
therein, that no one can be of any extreame predominance."174
American Tories and British officials stationed in the colonies had a second answer, one more difficult for Whigs to deal
with: No matter how arbitrary Parliament might be, the Whig
substitute would be worse. Parliament might not be restrained by
enforceable legal principles, but it was limited by tradition, history, custom, precedent, and centuries of evolving practice and
experience. What, on the other hand, restrained the American
Whig congresses and committees that undertook to control the
lives and affairs of individual citizens? Thomas Gage was not
alone in saying they exercised "Arbitrary Power." s "[They are
arbitrary," a "converted Whig" wrote, because "they allow not to
others who differ from them the same liberty of thinking and
acting that they claim themselves .....
I' In fact, even constitutional legislatures were so dominated by Whiggery they had to
be watched or would soon be arbitrary. New York's Lieutenant
Governor Cadwallader Colden, for instance, justified rejection of
colonial demands for judicial tenure quandiu se bene gesserint in
by its own consent. The members were "independent," no longer accountable. WLsoN,
supra note 54, at 728.
172. I will go farther, and assert, that the authority of the British Parliament
over America, would, in all probability be a more intolerable and excessive
species of despotism than an absolute monarchy. The power of an absolute
prince is not temporary, but perpetual. He is under no temptation to purchase
the favour of one part of his dominions, at the expence of another.
HAMILTON, supra note 170, at 100.
173. JEFFERSON, supra note 165, at 124.

174. 2 TRACTS, supra note 89, at 189.

175. Letter from General Thomas Gage to Governor Josiah Martin (Apr. 12, 1775),
in Gage Papers, Am. Series, Win. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.
176. A Converted Whig, Mass. Gazette, March 9, 1775, reprinted in 2 AMEIucN
ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 106 (P. Force ed. 1839) [hereinafter cited as 2 ARCHVES].

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 1

[Vol. 5, 1977]

Hofstra Law Review

order to "guard against the arbitrary Proceedings and undue Influence of an Assembly.' '

77

Other American Tories and imperial

officials called the actions of legislatures or extralegal committees
"arbitrary," either because they did not agree with specific measures' 78 or objected
to the implementation of uncontrolled popular
79
sentiment.

American Whigs disagreed and General Gage thought he
knew why. "No People," he wrote the Secretary for the colonies,
''were ever governed more absolutely than those of the American
Provinces are now, and no Reason can be given for the People's
Submission, but that it is a Tyranny they have erected themselves, as they believe, to avoid greater Evils."'' 0 They controlled
these committees and congresses, but had no check on Parliament and that was the distinction. Blackstone implied the difference did not matter. Great Britain, he claimed, avoided arbitrary
government because its lawmaking and law-enforcing functions
were separate, one vested in Parliament, the other in the king.'
As with much of his constitutional commentary, Blackstone was
idealizing a law contemporary lawyers would not have recognized.'8 2 Yet, even had Blackstone's constitution been a reality,
177. [C.

COLDEN], THE CONDUCT OF CADWALLADER COLDEN ESQUIRE

LATE LIEUTENANT

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK RELATING TO THE JUDGES COMMISSIONS, APPEALS TO THE KING, AND

THE STAMP-DUTY (1767), reprinted in 2 THE CoLDE

LETTER BOOKS 1765-1775, at 431 (10
Coll. N.Y. Hist. Soc'y of 1877, 1878).
178. Referring to the controversial vote of the Massachusetts assembly to tax the
imperial customs officials, the colonial secretary called the action "as unjust in its principle as it must necessarily be arbitrary in the assessment." Letter from the Earl of Hillsborough to Governor Thomas Hutchinson (Dec. 4, 1771), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1770-1783, at 246-47 (K. Davies ed. 1973). A merchant in New
Ipswick, New Hampshire, accused of profiteering by the local committee of inspection,
replied that "the Committee have proceeded in a most arbitrary and obstinate manner."
DavidHills to the Publick, Aug. 30, 1775, reprintedin 2 ARCHIVES, supranote 176, at 1712.
179. See the pointed, well-reasoned argument that legislation is "arbitrary and
unjust" when enacted by an assembly unguided by custom. "There is a line of Jurisdiction
for every order of men in a civilized state, beyond which they cannot pass; and fit it is
that Public Bodies should have boundaries, restrains, and limitations, since they are
equally liable with Individuals to be misled by passion, fancy, or caprice." It is "an
Arbitrary Act," therefore, to use public revenue to support a nongovernmental group
prompting the political program favored by the majority. E. LEIGH, CONSIDERATIONS ON
CERTAIN POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1774), reprintedin
THE NATUREOF COLONY CONSTITUTIONS: Two PAMPHLETS ON THE WILKES FUND CONTROVERSY

IN SOUTH CAROLINA BY SIR EGERTON LEIGH AND ARTHUR

LEE 63, 75, 77 (J. Greene ed. 1970).

180. Letter from Governor Thomas Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth (June 25, 1775),
reprinted in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL THOMAS GAGE WITH THE SECRETARIES OF
STATE 1763-1775, at 408 (C. Carter ed. 1931).

181. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 142-43 (1765).
182. See E. BARKER, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 121-54 (1945).
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few Americans could see how it protected those without a voice
in either body.
Blackstone did not wish to "be considered as an advocate for
arbitrary power,"" and perhaps for that reason was reluctant to
face up to parliamentary supremacy. True he could not avoid
recognizing it, but he could deprecate it. Parliament might be
sovereign and therefore potentially arbitrary, Blackstone admitted, but realistically the fact was immaterial as Parliament could
be trusted to avoid arbitrary power. 84
American Tories had no alternative except to agree with
Blackstone. "In truth," one told James Otis, "the freedom and
happiness of every British subject depends not upon his share in
elections but upon the sense and virtue of the British Parliament,
and these depend reciprocally upon the sense and virtue of the
whole nation." ' Oddly, Otis concurred. "Tho' most governments
are de facto arbitrary," he believed, "none are de jure arbitrary."'' 6 Put another way, "No legislative, supreme or subordinate, has a right to make itself arbitrary."17 Moreover, "[it
would be a most manifest contradiction for a free legislature, like
that of Great Britain, to make itself arbitrary.

'18

Otis, trapped

in a mire of legalisms, saw no solution to the constitutional dilemma except to trust that Parliament would act in a judicial
rather than political manner." 9 It was a constitutional theory too
farfetched for many Americans to accept.8 ' When the governor of
Massachusetts urged submission to the Stamp Act as a condition
for it being repealed or amended, the lower house protested that
passive obedience legitimatizes "arbitrary power."' 9 In fact, before very long, Massachusetts representatives would be saying
183. 1 BLACKSTONE,

CoMtENTAR I

243 (1765).

184. See GOUGH, supra note 95, at 190-91.
185. [M. Howard], A Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax, to His Friend in RhodeIsland, Containing Remarks Upon a Pamphlet, Entitled, The Rights of Colonies Examined 13 (1765).
186. James Otis, as quoted in L. LEDER, LiBErY AND AuTHoRiTY: EmLEy AMEMCAN

1689-1763, at 60 (1968).
187. J. Ors, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRrITsH COLONIES

IDEOLOGY

ASSEMBLED AND PROVED

36 (1764),

reprinted in 1 PAMPHLNTS, supra note 15, at 419, 446.

188. Id.
189. See Bailyn, Introduction,in 1 PAMPHLETs, supra note 15, at 412-14.
190. The time would come when the judicial power would be able to restrain the
legislative power because "while they recognize the power of the legislature to be supreme,
do not admit it to be arbitrary." Concord R.R. v. Greely, 17 N.H.2d 47, 56 (1845).
191. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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that trust was not part of the British Constitution and would even
hint that for the government to demand it might be unconstitu92
tional.
Even if Members of Parliament could be trusted to act from
the purest and most unselfish of motives, they might pass legislation arbitrarily due to mistaken interpretations of the constitution."9 3 That possibility, according to Dickinson, posed a substantial danger. Dickinson did not fear an arbitrary Parliament "for
want of justice or of affection towards us in our mother country;
but for want of proper attention ....

"'9 Trust

in morals, his-

tory, or law was not enough. Rights were rights only if secured
absolutely; subject to arbitrary power they were not absolute.
"[W]hat is the difference to us," Dickinson asked, "whether
arbitrary acts take their rise from ministers, or are permitted by
them? Ought any point to be allowed to a good minister, that
should be denied to a bad one? The morality of ministers, is a
very frail morality."'95 If the Stamp Act proved anything, it was
that Dickinson's warning applied as much to Parliament as to
ministers.' 8 James Wilson took the argument to where it terminated. Trust was unsafe, he argued. Acts of Parliament "must
depend upon the opinions and dispositions of the members."', 7
In truth, Otis's formula of secured liberty through trust, at
least regarding the contemporary constitution, was anachronistic.
192. It is the glory of the British constitution that it is built on more solid
foundations than the good intentions of men, the very consciousness of enjoying
the most invaluable benefits only by the good will of a fellow-creature must be
grating to every generous mind.
Letter from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the Earl of Dartmouth (March
15, 1773), reprintedin 6 DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 97.
193. Cato in Conn. Gazette, reprintedin The Boston Post-Boy and Advertiser, Sept.
9, 1765, at 1, col. 3.
194. Dickinson, An Address to the Committee of Correspondence in Barbadoes
(1766), reprintedin DICKINSON WRITINGS, supra note 38, at 251, 268.
195. Letter No. 12 From A Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British
Colonies, reprinted in DICKINSON WRITINGS, supra note 38, at 397, 404.
196. If it be said we have English Parliaments, which if in some Instances
they oppress us, can also grand us Redress; alas! What Comfort can we find in
thinking ourselves at the Mercy of a Power, that has already decreed to strip us
of every Thing that we hold most dear and sacred . . .? What confidence can
we have in the Mercy and Tenderness, that could pass such a cruel Decree, and
write such bitter Things against us? Does the Lamb when he feels the Telons of
the Lion in his Bowels, confide in his Mercy and Protection? Oh, no! unlimited
Power, must ever be the Object of Terror.
Freeman in The New York Gazette, reprintedin The Boston Post-Boy and Advertiser,
Dec. 2, 1765, at 2, col. 2.
197. WasoN, supra note 54, at 724.
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The theory dates back to the old English worry of arbitrary
prerogative power, to a time when people, seeking a barrier
against the crown, had no other recourse than to place confidence
in their representatives. For British subjects, living in eighteenthcentury England, Scotland, or Wales, that constitution adequately shielded them from arbitrariness. John Dickinson underlined the difference to Americans when explaining that representation provided voters in the mother country a measure of control
over legislation, at least to the extent that members of Parliament
shared with their constituents the consequences of enacted statutes:
Where these laws are to bind themselves, it may be expected,
that the house of commons will very carefully consider them:
But when they are making laws that are not designed to bind
themselves, we cannot imagine that their deliberations will be
as cautious and scrupulous, as in their own case.' 95
VII.

THE CONSISTENCY OF HISTORY

It is time to sum up and to ask what American Whigs sought
to accomplish when, following passage of the Stamp Act, they
resurrected a shopworn antiprerogative argument against arbitrary power and turned it upon Parliament. As well as anyone,
the voters of Westerly, Rhode Island, stated the argument when
they listed some of their constitutional grievances and drew the
constitutional conclusion
[t]hat the granting of salaries to the Governors and Judges of
the colonies; the enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty; the appointment of the Board of [Custom] Commissioners; the increase of the Custom House officers; the arbitrary
power given to those officers to break into any man's house (ever
considered by law as a sacred retirement from all force and
violence till now) ... the introducing fleets and armies to supply those officers and enforce a submission to every act of oppression, are inconsistent with every idea of liberty, and will
certainly, if not immediately checked, establish arbitrary power
and slavery in America, with all their fatal consequences. 99'
American Whigs were not confused; they knew that they
198. Letter No. 7 From A Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British
Colonies, reprinted in DICKINSON WRrINGS, supra note 38, at 350.
199. Resolves of Westerly, Feb. 2, 1774, reprinted in F. DENISON, WSTSrLY AND ITS
WITNESSES 111 (1878).
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were defending a constitution. At the same time, and with more
than a touch of irony, they understood that their constitution
might not be defendable because the British no longer honored
it. Their difficulty was not advocacy. There were arguments on
the American side, more valid from the perspective of 1649 or
1688 than 1776 perhaps, but valid nonetheless; that direct parliamentary taxation violated their charters, 0 their customary constitutions, 0 ' their constitutional contract, 202 and their rights as
Englishmen.0 3 No matter the contention, American constitutional pretensions always encountered the same answer: Parliament was not supreme. Constitutional formulas devised in bygone days to restrain the King were now irrelevant. Parliament,
British Whigs contended, could revoke charters, ignore custom,
breach the constitutional contract, and set limits upon individual
rights. Although the current British Constitution had been unforeseen by those who won the Glorious Revolution,0 4 the Americans were trapped by the very precedents to which they appealed.
By ending the threat that monarchy might become arbitrary,
Parliament had made itself arbitrary. The British-Blackstone,
Glenville, Lord Mansfield, and almost everyone of importance in
London-could think of no other constitution than that of absolute parliamentary supremacy. For them, a supreme Parliament
was a sovereign Parliament, not only over the home islands, but
sovereign in the conquered as well as the settled colonies.0 ' For
obvious reasons, the issue had lain dormant for 150 years and did
not surface until the Sugar and Stamp Acts. Only then did the
insoluable have to be solved.2

6

To formulate a solution, American

200. Reid, In the FirstLine of Defense: The Colonial Charters,the Stamp Act Debate
and the Coming of the American Revolution, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 177 (1976).
201. Reid, In Accordance With Usage: The Authority of Custom, the Stamp Act
Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 45 FORDHAM L. Rv. 335 (1976).
202. Reid, "In Our ContractedSphere" The ConstitutionalContract,the Stamp Act
Crisis, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1976).
203. Reid, In an Inherited Way: English ConstitutionalRights, the Stamp Act De.
bates, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1109 (1976).
204. The rise of parliamentary supremacy was "not foreseen by the men of 1689,
whose intention was only to subject the kingly power to the bounds of law as defined by
the parliamentary lawyers." G. TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 6-7 (1938).
205. Campbell v. Hall, 20 State Trials 239-354 (1774).
206. The Americans' right of self-government and self-taxation was not challenged
until the 1760's.
So long as most men are content with official actions, the insoluble question of
sovereignity lies dormant. But as soon as government policy is challenged by
influential groups of citizens, the question inevitably arises: to what extent are
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Whigs turned back to an anachronistic constitutional
maxim-that arbitrary power was unconstitutional-seeking to
utilize an historical legal theory to transcend the constitutional
reality that, after the Glorious Revolution, Parliament was supreme, Parliament was sovereign, and, by constitutional right,
Parliament was arbitrary.
Although it had been more logical to complain of arbitrary
power during the 1640's and 1680's than during the 1770's,"7 that
constitutional argument was still one of the strongest available to
American Whigs. The reason was that the British Constitution
rested on only one foundation, parliamentary supremacy, and if
that sovereignty were compromised, so was British liberty. As a
result, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy proved to be an
impregnable barrier for American Whigs to breach. Unable to
remove it, they had to find a path by which it could be avoided
or circled. One path, easy to utilize as well as obvious, would have
been an appeal to natural law. A few laymen used that argument,
but lawyers generally rejected natural law as authority in the
constitutional controversy. A surprising number, however, turned
to the King, calling upon him to revive the old balanced constitution and interpose his prerogative to protect the colonies from
parliamentary arbitrariness. The contention was logical from a
legal and historical perspective-the Glorious Revolution received validity from consent of the British people, Americans had
never consented, and hence the King continued to stand in relation to them and to Parliament as he had stood before the overthrow of James 11.211 Politically, of course, the argument could
the citizens free to express their views, and what weight are these views to play
in the decision-making process?
L.

STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

1529-1642, at 92 (1972).

207. The fact that the eighteenth-century controversy was not like the earlier controversy, a contest between the prerogative and Parliament, but a controversy between the King in Parliament and the colonies, made the legal arguments somewhat unreal. .

.

. [Slometime before the controversy began to

grow acute, the sovereignity of the King in Parliament had become a universally
accepted legal doctrine. But it was obviously very much more difficult to prove
the legal incorrectness of the actions of an admittedly sovereign body, than to
prove the legal incorrectness of the actions of a King whose prerogative powers
were by no means clearly ascertained.
11 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

117-18 (1938).

208. C.

BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL IDEA 111-17, 130-33 (Vintage ed. 1958); J. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE
LOWER HousES oF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONRES, 1689-1776, at 445-46 (1972);
F. HINKHOUSE, THE PaELmNARIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION As SEEN IN THE ENGLISH
PRESS 1763-1775, at 125 (1926); M. KAMMEN, A ROPE OF SAND: THE COLONIAL AGENTS,
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never wash.10 No British Tory, certainly not George Ill, was
about to give the prerogative back to the Americans. 21' The same
was true for fundamental law. There were many American Whigs
who hoped to revive fundamental law, converting it from a restraint on the crown to a restraint on Parliament."' It was, however, too late for any in Great Britain except radical civil libertarians to comprehend how rights could be employed as a barrier
to sovereignty. If liberty checked Parliament, Parliament was not
supreme and without a supreme Parliament liberty could not be
guaranteed.
. It was no more ironic for future American
republicans to plea
for royal protection than it was for the heirs of English constitutionalism to argue that arbitrary power violated the British Constitution. Twice during England's history, people successfully
employed that principle against the King, the second time guaranteeing that the crown would never become arbitrary by vesting
arbitrary power in Parliament. Seeking to restrain parliamentary
supremacy, yet being heirs of the same history that had made
parliamentary supremacy a constitutional necessity, American
Whigs sought to transcend that constitutional history by reanimating a constitutional principle that that history had obliterated. They were contending in a legitimate strain, while asking
both history and law to bend before the illogical.
In truth, the concept of arbitrariness did more than unite the
BRrISH POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 170, 299 (Vintage ed. 1969); A. HAMILTON,
THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 90-92,
98-99 (H. Syrett ed. 1961); T. JEFFERSON, SUMMARY VIEW (1774), reprintedin THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1761-1776, at 129-34 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); Van Alstyne, The Revolution Bursts, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATION, 1763-1794, at
59-64 (C. Ritcheson ed. 1969); The London Gazetteer, Jan. 11, 1766, reprintedin BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN'S LErrERS TO THE PRESS 1758-1775, at 48 (1950); Novanglus, #2, #7, & #12, in 4
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 37-38, 113-14, 174 (C. Adams ed. 1851). See also J. BoYD,
ANGLO-AMERICAN UNION: JOSEPH GALLOWAY'S PLANS TO PRESERVE THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1774-

1788, at 11 (1941): "The Parliament which represents the People of England, who choose
them, have no Right of Sovereignity over us; but the King has a constitutional Right and
that we have always submitted to, and always shall." Quoting letters from London written
by Americans, Dec. 1765, The Mass. Gazette, March 14, 1768, at 1, col. 3.
209. Answering American pleas for prerogative protection, Britain said "that whatever those kings James I and Charles II who claimed high prerogatives, might think, or
do, is now out of the question; for that all parts of the British dominions are now subject
to the British legislature, as established at the revolution." A late London newspaper, as
quoted in The Boston Evening-Post, Apr. 11, 1774, at 1, col. 1.
210. Robson, The American Revolution Reconsidered (1952), reprintedin THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: How REVOLUTIONARY WAS IT? 22-23 (G. Billias ed. 1965).
211. GOUGH, supra note 95, at 192-94.
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American Whigs with earlier English revolutionary movements.
Despite the inconsistency, the concept of arbitrariness gave to
Whig history in 1776 a consistency denied it by the British insistence that Parliament was supreme and sovereignty indivisible.
American Whigs had faced a dilemma when first they sought to
make constitutionally legitimate their opposition to parliamentary supremacy. It was a dilemma because they were determined
to find legal justification for their opposition yet, under the dynamics of English constitutional advocacy, they had to depend on
doctrines, precedents, and slogans drawn from the pre-1688
English Constitution-from the traditions of royalist or prerogative constitutionalism.
The Americans placed their trust in history and law, and
both history and law betrayed that trust. The argument against
arbitrary power-and, therefore, against parliamentary supremacy-had validity only if the constitution that English Whigs of
1688-89 had used to neutralize the prerogative and to create
parliamentary supremacy had a suprahistorical existence transcending history. If that constitution still existed-and American
Whigs had no choice but claim it did-it would be authority for
validating the constitutional claims of 1776 despite the constitutional resolutions of 1688-89. The issue was even more complicated: American Whigs were building part of their case against
parliamentary supremacy and the Glorious Revolution on the
foundations of historical royalist principles.
The factual contention of arbitrariness was more than an
historical constitutional concept providing American Whigs an
argument English lawyers (even though thinking it an anachronism) might recognize. More important, it furnished them a vehicle of advocacy with which to laicize an historical and constitutional dilemma. To oppose the arbitrary power that Parliament
began to assert with passage of the Stamp Act, those colonists
who called themselves "Whigs" did not have to abandon Whig
traditions despite opposing the institution that Whig history had
made supreme. They adapted seventeenth-century Whig arguments against the arbitrary nature of unrestrained prerogative by
transposing them into eighteenth-century Whig arguments
against the arbitrariness of parliamentary supremacy.
The centuries and, therefore, the constitutional challenges,
may have been different, yet concepts flowed in a regular pattern.
The Levellers also had asked for a return to "the just old Law of
the Land,'2 2 and had attempted to transcend the realities of
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history by ignoring the Norman conquest and reestablishing the
"old Law and custome of the Land"213 as it had existed in AngloSaxon times." ' For them the common law, the product of the will
and pleasure of an usurping conqueror, had, due to historical
215
reasons, no constitutional validity.
Using history to deny history, American Whigs were repeating history. The Levellers of the 1640's had claimed that the yoke
of arbitrary power had been imposed upon the English race by the
Norman Conquest." ' Although they could never have brought
themselves to say so-surely not openly-Whigs of the 1770's
claimed that arbitrary government was a yoke imposed by the
Glorious Revolution. An even more startling comparison may be
drawn: The English Levellers of the 1640's and the American
Whigs of the 1770's had in common the fact that both drew
strength from the republican future and the royalist past. Like
the Americans of a later day, the English radicals who lived under
Cromwell discovered that Parliament could be arbitrary and
turned to the people as the ultimate sovereign.2 t' Before reaching
that position, however, those radicals, again like the Americans,
turned to the past, to the royal prerogative, to furnish a constitutional restraint upon unlimited parliamentary supremacy." '
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Wrong conclusions must be avoided. It might be thought
that American Whigs were not really consistent-that they were
heirs not of the independents of 1649 or the Whigs of 1688, but
heirs of the Levellers. There is truth in such thoughts, but that
truth is not whole. American Whigs were also heirs of the first
212. R. OVERTON, CERTAIN ARTICLES FOR THE GOOD OF THE COMMON WEALTH (1647),
reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 190.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. For an analysis of the historical-legal theory, see PococK, supra note 57, at 12527.
216. PEASE, supra note 85, at 47. "[lts a Badg[e] of our Slavery to a Norman
Conqueror, to have our Laws in the French Tongue. " Petition to the Supream Authority
of England, the Commons Assembled in Parliament (1648), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 266.
217. "We for our preservation shall tread in the Parliament steps by appealingto the
People against them, as they did against the King." John Lilburne & Richard Overton,
as quoted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES, supra note 17, at 19.
218. John Lilburne, who had attacked Charles I as a tyrant when he associated
kingship with arbitrary power, would urge Cromwell to keep a good understanding with
the King after realizing how arbitrarily an unrestrained House of Commons could act.
PEASE, supra note 85, at 182-83.
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constitutional institution to protest against arbitrary parliamentary power, the English kingship as personified by Charles I. At
his trial, he voiced what in time would be the American constitutional premise: that arbitrary power unrestrained by law is unconstitutional. In fact, due to its intrinsic nature, arbitrary power
is an authority that any defender of liberty has a duty to ignore.2"9
Thus we might conclude that the American Whigs were not
acting in a consistent pattern. Indeed, it could be said that borrowing from extremes on both sides of the historical constitutional controversy, from radicalism and from monarchism, they
were less Whiggish than has been thought. Intellectually, however, if American Whigs owed something to the Levellers and to
Charles I, they owed more to the Whigs of 1688. Those Whigs, in
the name of the law, had rebelled against legitimate government
to eliminate the threat of arbitrary power. They introduced in its
place parliamentary supremacy, which did not seem arbitrary to
them and was not to Americans until the 1760's. It was only then,
when the parliamentary barrier against royal arbitrariness itself
became arbitrary, that American Whigs had cause to borrow from
contrary radical and monarchist traditions-traditions that had
first condemned parliamentary supremacy as arbitrary. The pattern of historical development may have been inconsistent, but
the constitutional strain was legitimate.
The English Whigs of 1688-89 had eliminated an arbitrary
power affecting themselves only to introduce a second that affected other people. Sovereignty, they believed, had to be unrestrained or it was not sovereign. It would become the American
constitutional mission to discover how power could be both legitimate and restrained.
219. Thus refusing to enter a plea to the charge of high treason, the King argued:
But it is not my Case alone, it is the Freedom and the Liberty of the People of
England: and do you pretend what you will, I stand more for their Liberties.
For if Power without Law, may make Laws, may alter the FundamentalLaws
of the Kingdom, I do not know what Subject he is in England that can be sure
of his Life, or anything that he calls his own.
JOURNAL OF THE HIGH COURT, supra note 111, at 43.
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